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I. INTRODUCTION 
The World Health Organization’s CHOICE program analyzes the cost 
effectiveness of various health interventions related to the Millennium Development 
Goals.1  The program identifies the best strategies for improving health in low-
income countries, using a standard set of methodological assumptions.2  These 
studies evaluate interventions in many areas, including child health3 and 
HIV/AIDS.4
For some of these treatments, drug costs are a significant variable:  if the drug 
price doubles, the intervention becomes less cost effective.  But if the drug price is 
reduced by 90%, then more therapies become affordable.5   
                                                 
†  Associate professor of law, West Virginia University.  Kevin.Outterson@mail.wvu.edu.  A 
Hodges Research Grant from the College of Law supported this research, as did David Davis, my 
research assistant.  I am also grateful for the comments received at the seminar held at the Boston 
University School of Law for this issue of the Journal.  
1  WORLD HEALTH ORG., CHOOSING INTERVENTIONS THAT ARE COST EFFECTIVE, available 
at http://www.who.int/choice/en/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
2  David B. Evans et al., Time to Reassess Strategies for Improving Health in Developing 
Countries, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 1133, 1135 (2005). 
3  Tessa Tan-Torres Edejer et al., Cost Effectiveness Analysis of Strategies for Child Health in 
Developing Countries, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 1177 (2005).   
4  Daniel R. Hogan et al., Cost Effectiveness Analysis of Strategies to Combat HIV/AIDS in 
Developing Countries, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 1431 (2005). The most cost effective interventions are mass 
media campaigns for safer sex, peer education and treatment of sex workers, prevention of mother to 
child transmission (PMCT), treatment of sexually transmitted infections, voluntary counseling and 
testing, and ARV therapy.  Id. at Tables 3 & 4. 
5  Critics such as Amir Attaran question whether patents are important barriers to essential 
medicines.  Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain 
Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886 (2001); see also Amir Attaran, How Do 
Patents and Economic Policies Affect Access to Essential Medicines in Developing Countries?; 
Poverty, Not Patent Policies More Often Inhibits Access to Essential Medicines in the Developing 
World, HEALTH AFF. 155 (Nov./Dec. 1994). One cannot have it both ways; if patents are indeed 
unimportant in developing countries, then the drug industry wouldn’t be hurt by giving up those 
patent rents.  For a more expansive rebuttal to Attaran’s more nuanced position, see Kevin Outterson, 
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage:  Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription Drug 
Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 255-58 (2005) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical 
Arbitrage].   
2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 32 NO. 2&3 2006 
Drug prices are uniquely susceptible to radical price reductions through generic 
competition.  Patented pharmaceuticals may be priced at more than 30 times the 
marginal cost of production;6 the excess is the patent rent collected by the drug 
company while the patent and exclusive marketing periods remain.7  Patent rents are 
significant.  AIDS drugs which sell for US$10,000 per person per year in the US are 
sold generically for less than US$200.8  If patented drugs could be sold at the 
marginal cost of production, cost effective treatments would become even more 
attractive, and other interventions would become affordable.  
This Article proposes marginal cost (generic) pricing9 for most essential 
medicines used in the developing world.  Global collection of patent rents must be 
relaxed in order to achieve this objective.  Some damage to the profits of 
pharmaceutical companies would ordinarily be expected, but a properly designed 
buy-out mechanism can ensure adequate incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.   
Two case studies are examined to illustrate the proposal:  the recently-developed 
Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccines for cervical cancer and second-line 
antiretroviral (ARV) treatments for AIDS. 
Global pharmaceutical markets and global disease burdens are mismatched, 
making this proposal uniquely attractive.  Some 80% to 90% of the global sales of 
patented pharmaceuticals occur in the 30 wealthy countries which are members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), roughly 
similar to the World Bank’s definition of 29 high-income countries.10  
Pharmaceutical markets for patented products largely follow the money.  
But the vast majority of patients needing treatment for global chronic and 
infectious diseases reside in non-OECD (middle- and low-income) countries.  These 
countries include more than 84% of the world’s people, and they are 
disproportionately sick.11  The global burden of disease falls most heavily where the 
market is least attractive.   
This mismatch between global pharmaceutical markets and global disease 
burdens leads to an interesting opportunity.  Patented pharmaceuticals could be 
offered to more than 84% of the world’s population at generic prices.  (Only high-
income country patients would continue to bear pharmaceutical patent rents).  The 
gain in health from increasingly affordable pharmaceuticals would be considerable.  
                                                 
6  Outterson, supra note 5, at 253-55 (demonstrating a differential pricing ratio exceeding 
30:1 on 1st line ARVs, and a ratio of 264:1 on Ciprofloxacin). 
7  Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain:  Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical 
Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67, 86-89 (2005) [hereinafter Outterson, 
Vanishing Public Domain]. 
8  Outterson, supra note 5, at 253.  When generic AIDS drugs were introduced in Malaysia in 
2004, the prices dropped by 90%.  Meraiah Foley, WHO Urges Nations to Bypass Patent Laws, 
NEWSDAY, Sept. 22, 2005. When generic AIDS drugs were introduced in Malaysia in 2004, the prices 
dropped by 90%.  Id. 
9  Under conditions of robust competition, generic pricing should approach marginal cost 
pricing. 
10   The official World Bank definition of high-income country is: “High-income country.  A country 
having an annual gross national product (GNP) per capita equivalent to $9,361 or greater in 1998.  Most 
high-income countries have an industrial economy.  There are currently about 29 high-income countries in 
the world with populations of one million people or more.  Their combined population is about 0.9 billion, 
less than one-sixth of the world’s population.  In 2003, the cutoff for high-income countries was adjusted to 
$9,206 or more.”  World Bank Group, DEPweb, 
http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/modules/glossary.html#h (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).   
11  See id.; see also ANDRÉS DE FRANCISCO, THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH: 2001-2002, 
91-92 (Sheila Davey ed., Global Forum for Health Research, 2002) (discussing neglected and very neglected 
diseases). 
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The primary disadvantage of this plan would be a quite small reduction in global 
R&D cost recovery; but even this small deficit could be restored to the companies 
through a carefully designed patent buy-out mechanism.  The World Health 
Organization recently agreed to appoint an intergovernmental working group to 
address issues of public health and innovation.12  This article illustrates some of the 
concepts which could be useful in that process.   
II. GLOBAL DISEASES:  BEYOND NEGLECTED DISEASES 
Much attention has been focused over the past decade upon ‘neglected’ or 
‘tropical’ diseases, conditions largely overlooked by global pharmaceutical research 
companies.13  Examples include onchocerciasis (river blindness),14 leishmaniasis 
(kala-azar), Chagas disease, and African sleeping sickness.15  In the past few years, 
donors have created some initiatives to direct R&D towards neglected diseases.16
The neglected disease programme tends to overlook the fact that chronic 
conditions in the high-income and low-income worlds are converging.17  It is the 
poor themselves who are neglected, rather than just their diseases.  Global diseases 
are conditions which affect patients in both rich and poor countries, but 
                                                 
12  World Health Organization, 59th World Health Assembly, PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION, 
ESSENTIAL HEALTH RESEARCH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  TOWARDS A GLOBAL STRATEGY 
AND PLAN OF ACTION (Agenda Item 11.11; A59/A/Conf.Paper No.8) (May 27, 2006) (hereinafter WHO 
GLOBAL R&D RESOLUTION). 
13  E.g., DE FRANCISCO, supra note 11; Bernard Pécoul et al., Access to Essential Drugs in 
Poor Countries:  A Lost Battle?, 281 JAMA 361 (1999); David B. Ridley et al., Developing Drugs 
For Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. 313 (2006); COMMISSION ON HEALTH RESEARCH FOR 
DEVELOPMENT, HEALTH RESEARCH: ESSENTIAL LINK TO EQUITY IN DEVELOPMENT 3 (Commission on 
Health Research for Development ed., Oxford University Press, 1990).  The WHO GLOBAL R&D 
RESOLUTION was not limited to tropical or neglected diseases, although it does focus on “diseases and 
conditions disproportionately affecting developing countries.”   WHO GLOBAL R&D RESOLUTION, 
supra note 12.  The case studies in this article concern AIDS and cervical cancer, both of which 
disproportionately affect people in developing countries.  
14  For a voluntary Merck program to address onchocerciasis, see Jeffrey L. Sturchio & Brenda 
D. Colatrella, Successful Public-Private Partnerships in Global Health:  Lessons from the MECTIZAN 
Donation Program, in THE ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 255 (Brigitte Granville ed., Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 2002).  
15  MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, FATAL IMBALANCE:  THE CRISIS IN RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT FOR DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES 11 (Médecins Sans Frontières Access to 
Essential Medicines Campaign, Sept. 2001), available at 
http://www.msf.org/source/access/2001/fatal/fatalshort.pdf. 
16  The Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative, founded by a group of seven organizations, 
focuses research and development efforts on 3 truly neglected diseases -- visceral leishmaniasis (Kala-
azar), Human African Trypanosomiasis (Sleeping Sickness), and American Trypanosomiasis (Chagas 
disease).  See DNDi: Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative, http://www.dndi.org (last visited Apr. 
18, 2006). 
17  Non-communicable disease accounted for 47% of the global burden of disease in 2001.  
World Health Org., WHO GLOBAL STRATEGY ON DIET, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND HEALTH 2 (May 
2004), available at 
http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/strategy/eb11344/strategy_english_web.pdf. Cardiovascular 
disease (CVD) and cancer (malignant neoplasms) are the first and second most common causes of 
death respectively in developing countries.  World Health Org., WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2003 81 
(2003), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2003/en/whr03_en.pdf.  “In 1998, non-communicable 
diseases were responsible for 59% of total global mortality and 43% of the global burden of disease. 
Importantly, 78% of NCD [non-communicable disease] deaths were borne by low- and middle-income 
countries, as was 85% of the NCD burden of disease . . . nearly 50% of deaths worldwide were due to 
CVD, diabetes, cancer and chronic lung disease.” STEPHEN LEEDER ET AL., A RACE AGAINST TIME: 
THE CHALLENGE OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 13-14 (2004). 
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disproportionately affect the poor.18  The global disease list includes many of the 
major chronic conditions associated with wealthy countries — including 
cardiovascular disease, stroke, mental illness, diabetes, and arthritis.  These diseases 
are the leading causes of adult disease burdens throughout the world:   
 
Figure 1. 
Top 10 Global Disease Burdens in DALYs,  
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18  Herein, the term global disease refers to conditions for which a therapeutic market exists in 
high-income countries, and the condition is also endemic to the low or middle income world. The 
definition of global disease is not static. Malaria was once a global disease, but is now largely 
eradicated in high-income countries, rendering it potentially neglected were it not for research for 
military and tourist markets.  Tuberculosis remains a significant condition in OECD markets, even 
though its disease burden falls heavily on the poor.  For a fuller discussion on global diseases in this 
context, see Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential 
Treatment in WTO Law:  Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing Countries, NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 25-28 (2005); Outterson, supra note 5, at 244-250. 
19  The graph depicts DALYs lost due to various conditions in men aged 15 and above in 2002.  
JUDITH MACKAAY & GEORGE A. MENSAH, WORLD HEALTH ORG. & CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
(CDC), ATLAS OF HEART DISEASE AND STROKE 46 (2004). 
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Figure 2. 
Top 10 Global Disease Burdens in DALYs, 
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The first characteristic of global diseases is that a robust level of research is 
assured by high-income markets alone.   Anticipated R&D cost recovery from low- 
and middle-income countries carry little or no weight in the decision to commit 
resources to R&D concerning global diseases.  The powerful lure of high-income 
markets—particularly the US, the EU, and Japan—draw R&D funds to global 
diseases, without much regard for the market potential in countries like Brazil or 
Costa Rica.21     
AIDS is a paradigmatic case of a global disease.  Several thousand early AIDS 
cases in the United States and Europe were sufficient to trigger an avalanche of 
science.22  The global aspects of the epidemic were either unknown or relatively 
unimportant to the decision to allocate research resources.  ARV drugs would have 
been invented on the same timetable even if no African or Asian had ever been 
infected.  High-income markets alone were sufficient incentive for discovery. 
Cancer is another global disease.  Development of HPV vaccines was prompted 
by the multi-billion dollar market to prevent less than 17,000 cervical cancer deaths 
                                                 
20  Depicting DALYs lost due to these conditions in women aged 15 and above in 2002.  Id. at 
47. 
21  Some observers claim that the incentive deficit in these countries is the lack of adequate IP 
laws. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha 
“Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 58-62 (2002).  As I have argued elsewhere at length, it is the 
poverty of the people, rather than the lack of IP laws, which makes the collection of pharmaceutical 
patent rents problematic in these countries.  See Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 
§ I.D.4.viii (arguing that global and neglected diseases do not require additional IP laws in developing 
countries). 
22  Many early AIDS-related drugs qualified for orphan drug status in the United States when 
the expected U.S. market was fewer than 200,000 persons. Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Policy: In 
Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 691, 703-707 (1993) (noting that the FDA designated AZT as 
an orphan drug in 1987 and half of AIDS drugs as of August 1991 were designated as orphans).  North 
America and Western Europe account for less than two million of the thirty-four to forty-six million 
people living with HIV/AIDS in 2003. UNAIDS/WORLD HEALTH ORG., AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 37 
(2003), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/epidemiology/en/epiupdate2003_III_en.pdf 
[hereinafter AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE].  
6 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 32 NO. 2&3 2006 
per year in high-income countries,23 even though more than 90% of cervical cancer 
deaths occur in low- and medium-income countries.24  Similar global disease 
profiles exist for other cancers:  one recent study listed the 12 major types of cancer 
for which the global burden of disease largely falls in the low- and middle-income 
countries.25  In every category the majority of the global cancer disease burden fell 
in low- and middle-income countries.26  Only cancers of the lungs, pancreas, colon 
and rectum were disproportionately found in high-income countries, but nevertheless 
the majority of the burden remained in low- and middle-income countries.27
Global diseases have a second important characteristic: global disease 
innovation can be shared without damaging innovation.  Knowledge is 
nonrivalrous.28  Global disease innovation can be offered to low- and medium-
income countries without damaging patent rents from high-income countries.  While 
diversion, theft and arbitrage from low-income to high-income markets is a potential 
threat, companies and governments possess many tools to block pharmaceutical 
arbitrage, and empirical evidence of significant dysfunctional arbitrage is limited.29   
The much more significant threat to high-income country patent rents – and to 
public health – comes from counterfeit pharmaceuticals, which are greatly 
encouraged by the high price discrimination ratios made possible by IP law.30  
Counterfeit pharmaceuticals are a grave threat to health in the developing world,31 
and the US drug supply chain itself appears remarkably vulnerable.32  One important 
ancillary advantage of generic pricing is the virtual elimination of the incentive to 
counterfeit drugs in low- and medium-income countries:  with artificial price 
discrimination stripped away, the vast majority of the economic incentive to create a 
counterfeit disappears.33   
With innovation assured, the further collection of patent rents can stand aside 
and permit generic-priced access for the majority of humanity.  The fruits of OECD 
global disease innovation can be freely shared with the low- and middle-income 
world through marginal cost pricing without harming innovation incentives. 
                                                 
23  Goodarz Danaei et al., Causes of Cancer in the World:  A Comparative Risk Assessment of Nine 
Behavioral and Environmental Risk Factors, 366 The Lancet 1784, 1787 (Table 2) (Nov. 19, 2005). See 
Ruth Mayne, United Nations Dev. Programme, Regionalism, Bilateralism, and “TRIP Plus” Agreements: 
The Threat to Developing Countries 21 (2005), 
http://hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background_papers/2005/HDR2005_Mayne_Ruth_18.pdf.  
24   K Shibuya et al., Global and Regional Estimates of Cancer Mortality and Incidence by Site:  
II. Results for the Global Burden of Disease 2000, 2 BMC CANCER 37 (2002) (table 7, excluding 
regions AMRO A, EURO A, and EURO B1).   
25  Danaei et al., supra note 23, at 1789 (Figure 2).  
26  Id. 
27  Id.  
28  Kevin Outterson, Fair Followers: Expanding Access to Generic Pharmaceuticals for Low-
Income Populations, in THE POWER OF PILLS (P. Illingworth & J. Clare, eds.) (forthcoming 2006) 
[hereinafter Outterson, Fair Followers]; Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain, supra 7, at 89-92 
(2005); Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 197, 217-19, 222-30; and the sources 
cited therein. 
29  These issues have been discussed at significant length in Outterson, Pharmaceutical 
Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 231-35, 261-68, 284-90. 
30  Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra 5, at 268-71; Kevin Outterson, Counterfeit 
Drugs:  The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 16 ALBANY L. J. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2006). 
31  WORLD HEALTH ORG., COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES, FACT SHEET NO. 275 (2006), available at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/. 
32  See generally KATHERINE EBAN, DANGEROUS DOSES:  HOW COUNTERFEITERS ARE 
CONTAMINATING AMERICA’S DRUG SUPPLY (Harcourt 2005). 
33  Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 268-71.  
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We now turn to two case studies to examine in more depth the potential for 
generic pricing in low- and middle-income countries.  
III. CASE STUDIES 
A. HPV VACCINES TO PREVENT CERVICAL CANCER  
Cervical cancer is a significant cause of cancer death for women worldwide.   
More than 470,000 cases are diagnosed each year,34 resulting in approximately 
230,000 annual deaths globally.35  Cervical cancer exemplifies the split between 
global disease burdens and markets:  about 92% of cervical cancer deaths occur in 
low- and middle-income countries,36 while perhaps 90% of the revenue market for 
cervical cancer treatments will be in high-income countries.37
The first HPV vaccine to prevent cervical cancer was recently approved by the 
US FDA.38  In 2002, Merck’s vaccine for Human Papillomavirus Type 16 (HPV-16) 
demonstrated significant efficacy against cervical cancer in a controlled trial.39  
Merck has also tested a quadrivalent HPV-6, -11, -16 and -18 vaccine, Gardasil.40  
In November 2004, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) published its positive results for a 
bivalent HPV-16 and -18 vaccine (Cervarix), based on trials in the US and Brazil.41  
In May 2006, an FDA Advisory Committee unanimously recommended approval of 
Gardasil for the US market,42 and the FDA approved the vaccine on June 8, 2006.43
The health potential for a generic priced HPV vaccine in low- and middle-
income countries is significant.  Within a generation of widespread vaccination, the 
most dangerous types of HPV could be largely eradicated.  GSK projects that its 
vaccine will be cost effective “in both screened and unscreened populations, with 
important long-term implications for cervical cancer prevention, especially in 
countries where screening is limited or unavailable.”44   
                                                 
34  See Dianne M. Harper et al., Efficacy of a Bivalent L1 Virus-like Particle Vaccine in 
Prevention of Infection With Human Papillomavirus Types 16 and 18 in Young Women:  A 
Randomised Controlled Trial, 364 THE LANCET 1757, 1757 (2004) (estimating 470,000 as of 2004); 
Christopher P. Crum, Editorial, The Beginning of the End for Cervical Cancer?, 347 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1703, 1703 (2002) (estimating 450,000 as of 2002). 
35  See Danaei et al., supra note 23, at 1787 (Table 2)(234,728); Paul D. Blumenthal & Lynne 
Gaffikin, Cervical Cancer Prevention:  Making Programs More Appropriate and Pragmatic, 294 
JAMA 2225, 2225 (2005) (more than 230,000). 
36  There were 218,064 deaths in low- and middle-income countries compared to 234,728 
deaths worldwide.  Danaei et al., supra note 23, at 1787 tbl.2.  The GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) study 
noted that “almost 80% of the cases occur in developing countries.”  Harper et al., supra note 34, at 
1757.  The difference derives from GSK using “developing countries” rather than “low- and middle-
income countries.” 
37  See MAYNE, supra note 23, at 26 (estimates of GSK’s global market for ARVs).  
38 Gardiner Harris, U.S. Approves Use of Vaccine for Cervical Cancer, NY TIMES, June 9, 2006. 
39  Laura A. Koutsky et al., A Controlled Trial of a Human Papillomavirus Type 16 Vaccine, 
347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1645, 1649 (2002). 
40  Press Release, Merck, Merck's Investigational Vaccine GARDASIL™ Prevented 100 Percent of 
Cervical Pre-cancers and Non-invasive Cervical Cancers Associated with HPV Types 16 and 18 in New 
Clinical Study (Oct. 6, 2005), available at 
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/research_and_development/2005_1006.html. 
41  Harper et al., supra note 34, at 1760 tbl.1 (somewhat less than half of the study participants 
were in Brazil). 
42  US FDA Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee, May 18, 2006.  
43 Harris, supra note 38. 
44  Harper et al., supra note 34, at 1764. 
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In the US, GSK’s Cervarix HPV vaccine is projected to cost between 
US$20,600 to US$60,000 per quality-adjusted life year (QALY), amounts which are 
considered cost effective in the US market.45  The GSK study does not disclose the 
anticipated US sales price of Cervarix in this model,46 but these estimates suggest 
that GSK could raise the vaccine price significantly in the US market while still 
keeping the QALY cost below US$75,000.47  Indeed, the study modeled total 
vaccination costs up to US$1000 per patient, at which point vaccination becomes 
less cost effective than screening alone.48  This data suggests an upper limit price of 
the Cervarix vaccine series at approximately US$623.49   
GSK projects annual sales of Cervarix to exceed £1 billion,50 a blockbuster 
drug.  While we do not know GSK’s anticipated unit price, the total female 
population aged 12 in all high-income countries is approximately 6 million 
persons.51  If GSK anticipates meeting half of that volume,52 then their Cervarix 
price in high-income countries must be approximately £333 per person, or about 
US$570.53  Merck recently announced that the wholesale price for Gardasil will be 
$360 per person in the US.54   
These calculations assume that only adolescent females are vaccinated, but the 
FDA Advisory Committee briefing package for Merck’s Gardasil included some 
discussions about vaccinating boys as well.  Apparently, Merck plans to market the 
HPV vaccine for both male and female adolescents.55  Doubling the vaccinated 
population would increase profits but reduce the cost-effectiveness threshold for 
HPV vaccines.  It should be noted that the clinical trials cited above only reported 
efficacy for vaccination of females. 
A cervical cancer vaccine which is affordable and just marginally cost effective 
in the US market will be too expensive and cost ineffective for the average family in 
a low- or middle-income market where health expenditures per capita average 
                                                 
45  Sue J. Goldie et al., Projected Clinical Benefits and Cost-Effectiveness of a Human 
Papillomavirus 16/18 Vaccine, 96 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 604, 608-609 (2004), available at 
http://jncicancerspectrum.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/jnci;96/8/604.pdf. 
46  The model identifies ‘vaccination costs’ of US$377 (base case), with a range of US$188 to 
US$565, but Table 1 does not identify how much is allocated to the “three brief clinic visits, 
surveillance and education costs” and how much derives from the cost of the vaccine itself.  Id. at 607 
tbl 1.  The model assumes 100% coverage of all 12-year old females in the U.S., a market of almost 
two million girls per year.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION BY 
SELECTED AGE GROUPS AND SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2004 tbl.2 
(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2004-sa.html.   
47  Goldie et al., supra note 45, at 609 tbl.3, 613 n.14. 
48  Id. 
49  Taking the US$1000 as an upper limit, and subtracting the US$377 base case.  If costs of 
the vaccine itself are already included in the base case, the upper limit would be somewhat higher.   
50  Ben Hirschler, Glaxo Says Cervarix to Transform the Vaccine Business, REUTERS, May 27, 
2005, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/business/biotech/20050527-0200-health-
glaxo-vaccines.html.  See MAYNE, supra note 23, at 21. 
51  HNP Summary Profile, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/HNPSummary/groupData/GetShowData.asp?sCtry=HIC (last 
visited May 9, 2006) (2002 data).   
52  Merck’s vaccine was granted FDA on June 8, 2006.  Harris, supra note 38.  
53  The exchange rate on Nov. 28, 2005 was 1 GBP = 1.72 USD.  One can find the current 
exchange rate at http://www.xe.com (the author used http://www.xe.com to deduce the figure in the 
text using the relevant exchange rate on Nov. 28, 2005). 
54   Harris, supra note 38; see also Panel Backs Vaccine for Cervical Cancer, New York Times, May 
19, 2006. 
55   Patrick Brill-Edwards, Gardasil Human Papillomavirus (Types 6, 11, 16, 18) Recombinant 
Vaccine 10, 14, 61-66 (April 19, 2006) (final briefing document filed by Merck to the US FDA for the May 
18, 2006 meeting of the FDA Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee). 
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US$73.40.56  Even a vaccine priced at 10% of the high-income price (say, US$36) is 
completely unaffordable.  If we use proportion of per capita health expenditures as a 
guide, the price outside of the OECD should not exceed $3.30 per patient and the 
price in low-income countries should not exceed $1.35.57   
The amount of money needed to purchase the low- and middle-income country 
IP rights to Cervarix or Gardasil are modest.  The lost market for GSK is 
approximately US$172 million per year, of which the lost R&D cost recovery is 
only US$29.2 million per year until patent expiration.58   
For a patent buy-out price of less than US$30 million per year, Cervarix or 
Gardasil could instantly become a generic medicine in all low- and middle-income 
countries.  The bulk of the world’s women would enjoy much greater access to a 
cervical cancer vaccine through generic pricing.  The companies would be fully 
rewarded for their lost sales in low- and middle-income markets.  The proposal is a 
bargain for global public health and good business for the companies.  
 
As this article was going to press, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
announced a $27.8 million dollar grant to study the use of the HPV vaccines in the 
developing world; this study will focus on “the goal of informing regional and 
global vaccine introduction efforts and international financing plans.”59  This study 
should evaluate the merits of this patent buy-out proposal as an alternative to the oft-
criticized voluntary programs recently proffered by global drug companies.  The end 
point for such studies should be the greatest possible vaccination coverage for 
women.  Generic pricing outside the OECD is one important component in that 
program. 
1. Diagnostic tests for cervical cancer 
Diagnostic tests present special cost effectiveness issues.  Cheaper diagnostics 
for AIDS (such as CD4 counts) or microbial infections (identifying susceptibility to 
enable better targeting of antibiotics) could lead to more cost effective treatment 
with less potential for developing resistance.60  But diagnostic tests might also 
inappropriately drive up health care costs.  For example, Digene Corporation has 
developed a diagnostic test for HPV.61  What is not known at present is whether a 
cheaper diagnostic would be cost effective from a societal view.  In the US, routine 
Pap screening leads to several billion dollars of clinical intervention of doubtful 
                                                 
56  HNP Summary Profile, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/HNPSummary/groupData/GetShowData.asp?sCtry=LMY (last 
visited May 9, 2006) (2002 data). 
57 Kevin Outterson, HPV Vaccines to Prevent Cervical Cancer:  Do Patients or Shareholders Come First? 
(working paper, June 10, 2006). 
58  Kevin Outterson, NONRIVAL ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICAL KNOWLEDGE, Global Forum 8, 
WHO/United Nations Global Forum for Health Research conference on the Millennial Development 
Agenda (Mexico City) (presented Nov. 18, 2004).  This calculation assumes a global market for 
Cervarix of £1 billion per year, with 10% falling in low- and medium-income countries.  See MAYNE, 
supra note 23, at 21.  The R&D cost recovery percentage is estimated using the 17% number touted by 
PhRMA, which probably represents an upper limit estimate. Patrica Barry, Drug Profits vs. Research, 
AARP BULLETIN (June 2002), available at http://www.carlmcmillan.com/drug_profits_vs.htm.  
59 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Press Release, June 5, 2006; PATH Press Release, June 5, 2006 
available at http://www.path.org.  
60  Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 7, at § III.A.1.d. 
61  Michael Barbaro, Digene to Adapt Cancer Test For Use in Developing World, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 18, 2004, at E 05. 
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efficacy and cost effectiveness since most HPV infections regress on their own.62  
The wasteful use of clinical resources following abnormal Pap screening is well 
known; indeed, GSK’s HPV-16/18 vaccine derives a significant portion of its 
projected cost effectiveness from avoiding “more than US$6 billion … spent each 
year on the evaluation and management of low-grade lesions, the majority of which 
would regress without intervention.”63
Of more immediate importance to the developing world, Digene has also created 
a streamlined version of the HPV test for use in resource-limited settings.64   It is 
quite possible that more effective detection of HPV might lead to clinical 
interventions with very unfavorable cost effectiveness profiles, inappropriately 
expanding profligate US practices to resource constrained settings.  Nevertheless, 
the patent holder for the HPV test is engaged in a global campaign to promote the 
adoption of its test as the global standard of care, utilizing clinical sales 
representatives, direct to consumer advertising, and strategic relationships with 
women’s groups and providers.65      
B. SECOND-LINE HAART DRUGS FOR AIDS 
When the Millennium Development Goals were first articulated in 2000,66 
treatment of AIDS with antiretroviral drugs was not considered cost effective for 
low-income populations.  Annual costs per patient exceeded US$7,000 for first-line 
Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) in drug costs alone.67   In the 
world’s low-income countries, per capita health expenditures are only US$29.68  As 
recently as December 2000, HAART prices were so high that the World Bank still 
considered ARV treatment in poor countries to be not cost effective.69  HAART was 
simply too expensive. 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Partners In Health refused to listen to 
conventional wisdom and began treating some of the world’s poorest AIDS patients 
with HAART.70  In the days before the global implementation of the World Trade 
Organization TRIPS Agreement,71 several Indian and Thai companies produced and 
                                                 
62  DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DIV. 
OF STD PREVENTION, PREVENTION OF GENITAL HPV INFECTION AND SEQUELAE:  REPORT OF AN 
EXTERNAL CONSULTANTS’ MEETING, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/dstd/Reports_Publications/HPVSupplement%20.pdf cited in Harper et al., 
supra note 34 at 1764 n. 38 (2004). See also Sue J. Goldie et al., Policy Analysis of Cervical Cancer 
Screening Strategies in Low-Resource Settings:  Clinical Benefits and Cost-Effectiveness, 285 JAMA 
3107-3115 (2001).   
63  Sue J. Goldie et al., supra note 45, at 604 n.4, 612. 
64  Barbaro, supra note 61, at E 05.  
65  DIGENE CORPORATION 2005 ANNUAL REPORT (2005), 
http://ccbn.mobular.net/ccbn/7/1155/1214/print/print.pdf.  
66  United Nations Millenium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 8th plen. Mtg., 
U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/L.2 (Sept. 18, 2000). 
67  Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 250-52. 
68  HNP Summary Profile (2002 data), available at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/HNPSummary/groupData/GetShowData.asp?sCtry=LIC. 
69  See Barton Gellman, An Unequal Calculus of Life and Death; As Millions Perished in 
Pandemic, Firms Debated Access to Drugs, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000, at A1.  
70  MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES`, SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES: PROCUREMENT OF 
ANTIRETROVIRAL MEDICINES IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES (2003), 
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/procurementreport.pdf (report prepared by MSF at the 
request of the WHO). 
71  See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 27.1, Legal 
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exported HAART drugs generically, even though the patent remained valid in 
OECD countries.72  The combination of public outcry and generic competition 
forced the prices down to less than US$200 per patient per year.73   
With these dramatic cost reductions, HAART therapy is now deemed cost 
effective worldwide.  One recent study evaluated several strategies regarding 
HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO region: Afr-E) and South East Asia (Sear-
D).  The study recommends a range of HIV/AIDS interventions which are highly 
cost effective in low-income countries, with a cost per disability adjusted life year 
(DALY) ranging from Int$3 to Int$1144 in Afr-E.74  The study assumes the annual 
drug cost of first-line HAART to be Int$177.80,75 following the data gathered by 
MSF.76   
Most patients cannot remain on first-line HAART drugs indefinitely.  Whether 
due to resistance or intolerance to specific drugs, after a number of years an 
increasing number of surviving patients require second-line therapy.77  Second-line 
drugs such as protease inhibitors are not generally available at generic prices in the 
developing world.78 Patented second-line therapies are very expensive in low-
income countries.  Even with voluntary discount programs, second-line therapies 
cost ten to twenty-six times more than the first-line drugs.79  The world is stumbling 
towards a second AIDS holocaust, even while we struggle to make first-line 
therapies affordable and available to the millions who lack treatment access.80
                                                                                                                      
Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS or TRIPS 
Agreement]. The United States implemented the WTO agreements in the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).  
72  This narrative has been told by many.  See, e.g., Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, 
supra note 5, at 250-58. 
73  MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS:  A PRICING 
GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARV’S FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (8th Ed., June 2005), available at 
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/untanglingtheweb%208.pdf [hereinafter MSF, PRICING 
GUIDE]; Marleen Boelaert et al., Letter to the Editor, 287 JAMA 840, 840 (2002) (“This impressive 
discount offered by the companies to developing countries was not merely due to public outcry, but 
mostly as a response to competition by generic drugs.”).  
74  See generally Hogan et al., supra note 4. The most cost effective interventions are mass 
media campaigns for safer sex, peer education and treatment of sex workers, prevention of mother to 
child transmission (PMCT), treatment of sexually transmitted infections, voluntary counseling and 
testing, and ARV therapy.  Id. at Tables 3 & 4. 
75  Id. at Table A (supplement). 
76  See MSF, PRICING GUIDE, supra note 73, at Table A (supplement) n. 5. 
77  Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 7, at 74-75. 
78  A recommended second-line regime is TDF+ddI+LPV/r.  MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE HEARING ON TRIPS AND ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES 6 (Jan. 2005), available at http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/cgi-
bin/as.cgi/0345000/c/start/file=/9345000/1/j9vvgy6i0ydh7th/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f=/vgz6mnudecs3.pdf. 
[hereinafter HEARING].  Second-line treatments also are important in conservation of resistance, and 
there is no FDC available for second-line treatment as a result of the patents; see Wanla Kulwichit, 
First-line and Second-line Antiretroviral Therapy, 364 THE LANCET 329, 329-330 (2004), available at 
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/vol364/iss9431/full/llan.364.9431.analysis_and_interpretation.3031
1.1.  
79  HEARING, supra note 78, at 5-6 (second-line treatment in low income countries costs about 
US$3,950 per year, and as high as US$ 5,000 per year). N.   Kumarasamy, Comment, Generic 
Antiretroviral Drugs – Will They Be The Answer to HIV in the Developing World?, 364 THE LANCET 
(July 3, 2004), available at http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/documents/Lancet2JulycommentaryFDC.pdf.   See also MSF, PRICING GUIDE, supra note 73 
at 9. 
80  WORLD HEALTH ORG., 3 X 5 PROGRESS REPORT (Dec. 2004), 
http://www.who.int/3by5/ProgressReportfinal.pdf.   
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The non-OECD buy-out price for HAART first- and second-line treatments 
would be modest, given the scale of the epidemic.  Pharmaceutical companies will 
not suffer significant lost profit if all sales of HAART products dropped to zero in 
every low- and middle- income country.  GSK is the largest global seller of HAART 
drugs.81  GSK reports its sales to the SEC in three geographic regions: the United 
States, Europe, and “International.”82 This latter category includes high- income 
countries such as Japan, Canada and Australia, as well as low- and middle-income 
countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East.83 Even so, total 
International HAART drug sales in 2003 were only £155 million,84 in a year in 
which gross profit was £17.2 billion and selling, general, and administrative 
(SG&A) expenses were £7.5 billion.85 Actual profits from HAART sales in both 
low- and middle- income markets are likely to be negligible to GSK’s global profits 
and R&D, particularly if OECD markets in these countries remain commercial.  The 
estimated non-OECD buy-out price for all of GSK’s HAART portfolio is just 
US$11.3 million per year in lost R&D cost recovery.86  The annual budget of the 
Global AIDS Conference exceeds this amount with millions to spare.87  With the 
lives of millions at risk, and billions being spent on AIDS programs, the buy-out 
price is stunning in its modesty. 
C. THE WEAKNESS OF VOLUNTARY PRICING PROGRAMS 
Voluntary programs undoubtedly assist some patients.  Novartis makes Glivec 
(imatrinib) available to 346 chronic myeloid leukemia patients in Malaysia through a 
patient-based assistance program.88  Voluntary donations of ARVs reach some AIDS 
patients, and many donor programs are under way, but 90% of the global need is 
unmet.89  Pfizer’s limited donation of Diflucan (fluconazole) (an anti-fungal agent 
useful for many purposes, including opportunistic infections in AIDS patients) was a 
public relations triumph in December 2000,90 and yet complaints persist that Pfizer 
                                                 
81  GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 61-63, available at 
http://www.gsk.com/investors/reps03/annual_report2003.pdf.   
82  Id. 
83  Id.  
84  Id.  
85  Id.  
86  Assuming that 75% of the International sales are to Canada, Australia, Japan and other 
high-income countries (i.e., low- and middle-income global HAART sales by GSK of approximately 
£38.75 million per year).  At an exchange rate of 1 GBP = 1.72 USD, and again assuming 17% of 
sales are reinvested into R&D, the annual buy-out price until patent expiration is just US$11.3 million 
per year.  As a rough test of the Canada assumption, I checked IMS data for all sales of ARVs in the 
Canadian market in 2004 for all companies.  The total for the year ending October 2004 was US$130 
million.  (IMS Data, Canada, series J5C1, J5C2 and J5C3).  If GSK’s ARV market share in Canada is 
40%, then GSK’s Canadian sales were approximately £30 million in 2004, about 20% of the 
“International” total.  See id. 
87  The budget for the 2004 Bangkok Conference was US$17 million.  Press Release, 
Communications Department, XV International AIDS Conference (July 16, 2004), available at 
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/uploaded_files/ias_pressrelease.pdf. 
88  Tee Shiao Eek, Making Treatment Affordable, STAR ONLINE (Malaysia), July 3, 2005, 
available at http://202.186.86.35/health/story.asp?file=/2005/7/3/health/11352481&sec=health 
89  WORLD HEALTH ORG., “3 X 5” PROGRESS REPORT 49 (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.who.int/3by5/pr_en.pdf. 
90  The Diflucan® Partnership Programme, http://www.diflucanpartnership.com (last visited 
May 9, 2006). 
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only permits a miniscule amount to reach patients.91  In November 2005, Merck and 
Bristol Myers Squibb granted royalty-free licenses to the International Partnership 
for Microbicides for an anti-HIV vaginal gel.92  The grants are laudable steps, but 
are limited to a very specific product.93  In the most notable cases, significant 
voluntary price reductions were triggered by unlicensed generic production or the 
threat of compulsory licensure.94  No one should mistake voluntary programs for a 
systematic, sustainable solution.95
IV. THE PATENT BUY-OUT PROPOSAL  
This Article proposes marginal cost (generic) pricing of patented 
pharmaceuticals for low- and middle-income populations (more than 84% of the 
world’s population).  Innovation is assured by reimbursing the companies for all lost 
R&D cost recoveries in those markets.  Risks are minimized because the present IP 
system is retained for more than 80% of the global patent-based cash flow of the 
pharmaceutical companies.  The following steps are proposed: 
1. The purchaser acquires the patent and exclusive marketing rights for a 
patented global medicine from the patent owner, limited to a particular 
geographic market.  (Example:  the Global Fund purchases from GSK the 
global non-OECD rights to GSK’s new cervical cancer vaccine.  GSK 
retains the rights to the vaccine in all OECD countries). 
2. The purchaser offers an open, non-exclusive, no royalty license to any 
legitimate generic manufacturer, but only for sale in the target markets.  
(Normal patent-based pricing remains in all OECD countries; generic 
pricing through multiple manufacturers prevails in all non-OECD 
countries). 
3. The patent owner is compensated under a buy-out formula which mimics 
the lost R&D cost recovery from the foregone sales.  (Example:  GSK is 
paid for the lost R&D cost recovery from cervical cancer vaccine sales in 
non-OECD countries). 
A. THE PURCHASER  
The purchaser could be a government (the US or the EU), inter-governmental 
organization (WHO, UN, WTO, or the Global Fund), or a foundation donor (Gates).  
Governments can exercise compulsory licensure powers within their territories, but 
this proposal cannot rely solely on the current scope of compulsory licensure.  The 
transaction costs and political opposition to negotiating compulsory licenses for each 
market country have proven to be almost insurmountable.  In the five years since the 
much-hyped ‘Doha Solution’ to compulsory licenses for export, not a single pill has 
                                                 
91  See AEGiS-TAGline: Stern Words For Pfizer, 
http://www.aegis.com/pubs/tag/2004/TAG041107-04.html (last visited May 9, 2006). 
92  Press Release, The International Partnership for Microbicides, IPM Signs Drug Licensing 
Agreements with Merck and Bristol-Myers Squibb (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://www.ipm-
microbicides.org/. 
93  See Justin Gillis, AIDS Gel on a Faster Track; Merck, Bristol to License Drugs for Use in 
Poor Countries, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005, at A04.   
94  Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 223-30. 
95  See Tihana Bicanic et al., Antiretroviral Roll-Out Access To Treatment for Cryptococcal 
Meningitis, 5 THE LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 530, 530 (Sept. 2005) (“a system that relies on 
philanthropic initiatives by the pharmaceutical industry and the pressure of lobby groups cannot result 
in sustainable access to medicines.”). 
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been produced under that protocol.96  By offering compensation in exchange for the 
non-OECD license, it is hoped that pharmaceutical companies will embrace this 
proposal rather than force governments to pursue parallel compulsory licensure 
processes. 
B. THE TARGET MARKET  
The simplest formulation would divide the world in two:  the thirty relatively 
richer countries that are members of the OECD97, and all other countries.  Simplicity 
means rough justice, but surely rough justice is better than no justice.  Poverty does 
not strictly follow political boundaries.  Some elites in poor countries will gain 
access to generic-priced medicines when they could have afforded full price.  Some 
poor people in OECD countries may not be able to afford their prescriptions, and 
could have benefited from generic pricing.98  Perhaps the latter group can be left to 
the care of their relatively-affluent governments (although in the US, approximately 
27% of the population lacked prescription drug insurance in 2005 prior to the 
introduction of Medicare Part D).99  Over-inclusion of developing-country elites is 
more likely to attract controversy.   
Over-inclusion results in lost patent rents, particularly in countries like China, 
India and Brazil with millions of middle class consumers.  If simplicity is desired, 
this over-inclusion will simply be tolerated.  It will increase the buy-out price, so the 
companies still receive their due rewards.  If anything, the inequity is between the 
donor and the target country government.  Perhaps China, Brazil or India (or similar 
countries) could compensate the donor for this inappropriate subsidy.  
Alternatively, PhRMA companies have demonstrated remarkable skill in 
segmenting markets with tiered differential pricing within particular countries.100  
The persistence of domestic differential pricing within the US, even in the face of 
extensive donor programs, is a testament to the effectiveness of market segmentation 
by PhRMA companies and the apparent weakness of actual pharmaceutical arbitrage 
pressure. Possible mechanisms are brand campaigns with trademarks, differential 
pricing by payor, and domestic legal restrictions on arbitrage.101   
C. THE GENERIC LICENSE  
The purchaser will offer a non-exclusive, no-royalty license to all legitimate 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.  Negotiations will not be required, and transaction 
costs will remain very minimal. 
                                                 
96  The Fourth Ministerial Conference was held in 2001.  As of June 1, 2006, no country had 
provided notice of intent to export under the Paragraph 6 statement.  See Trips and Public Health, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_e.htm.   
97  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States. 
98  These issues of over-inclusion and under-inclusion are discussed at greater length in 
Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 5, at § I.D.4.iii. 
99  Dana Gelb Safran  et al., Prescription Drug Coverage And Seniors:  Findings From a 2003 
National Survey, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Apr. 19, 2005, at W5-160. 
100  Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 206-216.  
101  Within the U.S. market, internal diversion is illegal in many cases. See, e.g., Heather Won 
Tesoriero & Gary Fields, FBI, FDA Investigates Big Drug Wholesaler, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2003, at 
B1 (reporting alleged diversion from discounted hospital markets to higher-priced secondary markets). 
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In order to maximize the geographic reach of the generic licenses, and to ensure 
competition in each country, drugs licensed under this system which are pre-
qualified by the WHO should be granted automatic marketing approval in all of the 
target countries, a form of reference approval in lieu of a country by country ANDA 
process.102
D. SETTING THE BUY-OUT PRICE103  
The buy-out price must be set high enough to optimize global pharmaceutical 
innovation and low enough to be affordable for all global diseases. Lanjouw and 
Jack effectively set the price at zero by requiring drug companies to choose between 
patents in rich countries or poor countries.104 If global pharmaceutical appropriation 
is already supra-optimal, then zero (or a negative value) is the correct price.105 
Policymakers should have transparent access to reliable data on global 
pharmaceutical innovation in order to answer that question.  
If the goal of the buy-out price is to mimic what would have happened under 
best-case competitive market conditions, then the price should be based on expected 
profits rather than sales or costs. Ganslandt, Maskus & Wong used cost data to 
calculate their buy-out price, which rewards effort rather than success.106 Gross sales 
are certainly an element of pharmaceutical appropriation, but the relevant market 
metrics are the net present value (NPV) of the cash flow or the NPV of the profit 
stream. The purpose of the buy-out price should be to restore the expected profits, 
and more particularly, the lost R&D cost recovery. 
Expected future profits will of course be difficult to estimate and subject to 
gaming. The following formula relies to the greatest extent possible on externally 
generated data, to avoid data manipulation and methodological squabbles, with 
retrospective experience adjustments:  
 
BOP = NPVt (d) (U * M) p 
 
BOP is the buy-out price; NPV is the net present value over the patent period t 
at discount rate d; U is the number of generic units sold in the target markets by all 
sellers during t; M is the marginal cost of production per unit, estimated as the 
lowest sustained actual price per unit during t; p is a profit adjustor, reflecting the 
percentage of revenues allocated to R&D cost recovery (14-17% are the estimates 
from drug companies).   
Estimated payments could be made at buy-out, subject to periodic and 
retrospective adjustment as actual data developed on U and M, and perhaps for 
changes in d. The formula minimizes the need to know actual costs, profits, or 
average sales prices. The only data required are actual number of generic unit sales 
and the lowest sustained price by any generic seller in the target markets.  Both are 
                                                 
102  For an expanded discussion on this reference approval idea, see Outterson, Pharmaceutical 
Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 236-38. 
103  An expanded version of the buy-out price analysis, together with discussion of the literature 
and alternative models, may be found in Outterson, Fair Followers, supra note 28, at § 5.3. 
104  See Jean .O. Lanjouw & William Jack, Trading Up: How Much Should Poor Countries Pay 
to Support Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 4 CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 1-8 (2004), available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2842/.   
105  Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 220-22. 
106  Mattias Ganslandt et al., Developing and Distributing Essential Medicines to Poor 
Countries: The DEFEND Proposal, 24 WORLD ECON. 779-795 (2001). 
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relatively easy to collect and difficult for the patent holder (or anyone else) to 
manipulate. 
This formula aligns incentives against rent-seeking and allocative inefficiency in 
helpful ways. The license encourages any pharmaceutical company to manufacture 
and sell the drug generically in all target markets. Competition will drive the unit 
price down towards the actual marginal cost of production. In a competitive market 
with multiple entrants, no single company controls either U or M, but they each have 
strong market incentives to maximize U and to minimize M, which translates into 
the greatest access for a market-determined low price.  
V. CONCLUSION 
For a remarkably modest price, the battles over TRIPS and essential medicines 
could be largely resolved.  Pharmaceutical rent appropriation could be avoided in 
low- and middle-income countries, while fully protecting innovation incentives.  As 
the chronic diseases of the rich and poor worlds converge, a noble opportunity arises 
for doing well while doing good. 
